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Assessing the Competitive Effects of
Surcharging the Use of Payment
Mechanisms
Steven Semeraro1
The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking
the non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s
merchant contracts contends that point–of–sale competition on
the price of making a purchase with a credit card is an instrument
creating economic efficiency. That is, the economy would run
more efficiently, and consumers would be better off, if merchants
were free to charge variable prices for different types of credit
cards. After all, charging different prices for using different types
of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of
presumptively positive price competition.
The Second Circuit rejected that conclusion, recognizing that in
credit card markets competition already occurs at multiple points.
American Express must compete to:
• convince cardholders to apply for and use its cards; and
• convince merchants to accept its cards.
The question, the Second Circuit correctly recognized, is whether
adding a third type of competition – for cardholders to use the

1

Steven Semeraro is a professor of law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and the
author of numerous articles on the impact of surcharging credit card transactions on retail
prices including The Antitrust Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card
Transactions, 14 STAN. J. OF BUS. & FIN. 343 (2009) and The Reverse-Robin-Hood-CrossSubsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40
RUTGERS L. J. 419 (2009).
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card when merchants pass through their card acceptance fees –
would make American Express’s card network more efficient?
By prohibiting merchants who accept American Express cards
from discriminating against the brand, the card company imposed
a unilateral vertical restraint. Such restraints are often deemed to
be reasonable under the antitrust laws because they may
“stimulate inter–brand competition.” This is because an upstream
provider, like American Express, has little interest in reducing its
downstream sales. It would only impose a vertical restraint if that
restraint efficiently helped it to sell more products. Only when an
upstream or downstream provider has market power enabling it
to impose restraints that harm consumers by raising price or
lowering quality does a vertical restraint violate the antitrust
laws.
The Department of Justice’s theory postulated that the non–
discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant
agreements harmed consumers by effectively requiring merchants
to increase their prices to cover higher credit card fees for all
customers because merchants could not pass the cost of accepting
American Express directly to American Express’s own customers.
The Second Circuit acknowledged the potential for consumer
harm would exist if American Express charged merchants supra–
competitive prices and pocketed the excess as rents. But the court
held that the government failed to prove that rivalry on the price
consumers pay to use a credit card at the point of sale would
increase efficiency in credit card markets. As the Second Circuit
explained, credit card markets are two–sided. In order to prove
harm to consumer welfare in a two–sided market, an antitrust
plaintiff needs to show that a restraint makes the overall system
less efficient. That is, do consumers overall pay more for less
because of the restraint.
A card network like American Express must compete for both
cardholders and merchants. One therefore cannot demonstrate
that price increases on one side of the market are inefficient
without examining how those prices impact competition on the
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other side of the market. American Express argued that it used
increased revenue from the merchant side to offer a better card
product to its cardholders and compete more effectively with other
card networks, like Visa, for cardholder loyalty.
The Second Circuit did not definitively decide whether American
Express’s non–discrimination provisions were pro– or
anticompetitive. It simply concluded that two–sided market
economics made the question more complex than the government
plaintiffs acknowledged in trying the case. And based on the
record evidence, the court couldn’t tell whether the non–
discrimination provisions made the market more or less efficient.
Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proving harm to
competition, i.e. a reduction in efficiency to the overall market,
the government plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.
Part I reviews the economics of two–sided markets and provides
reasons to conclude that non–discrimination provisions in credit
card markets are efficient. Part II explains that a market’s two–
sided nature does not guarantee that participants in that market
will charge competitive prices. Card systems with market power
could set merchant fees at supra–competitive levels, leaving the
market less efficient. This Part then contrasts Visa’s and
MasterCard’s fees in the 1990s and early 2000s–which were
challenged by merchants in a class action–with American
Express’s current fees. It concludes that the factors giving the
merchants a plausible case against Visa and MasterCard do not
support the government plaintiffs in their case against American
Express. Part III addresses a systemic concern expressed in a
recent New York Times editorial about how a decision in
American Express’s favor might impact the future enforcement of
antitrust claims against dominant firms. This Part concludes that
those concerns are unfounded. The Sherman Act has two principle
sections. Truly dominant firms would remain subject to scrutiny
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 1 vertical
restraint cases already require proof of consumer harm no
different from what the Second Circuit required in its decision
favoring American Express.



31

32

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:29

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 32
I. THE ECONOMICS OF CREDIT CARD NETWORKS ............................. 35
A. Understanding Two–sided Markets........................................... 36
B. Applying Two–sided Market Theory to Card Markets ............... 38
II. SUPRA–COMPETITIVE CREDIT CARD PRICING ............................... 41
A. Visa and MasterCard Settlements ............................................ 42
B. Inefficient Cost–Shifting Among Consumers ............................ 42
III. SYSTEMIC ANTITRUST CONCERNS ................................................ 44
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 47

INTRODUCTION
In his seminal law review article The Limits of Antitrust, Judge (then–
Professor) Frank Easterbrook argued that “[a] ‘competitive market’ is not
necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment–to–moment . . . . Every
market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in order to
facilitate competition elsewhere.”2 “Antitrust aims at preserving
competition as an instrument for creating economic efficiency . . . .
[C]ompetition cannot be defined as the state of maximum rivalry, for that
is a formula of disintegration.”3
The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking the
non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant
acceptance contracts illustrates how difficult Easterbrook’s insight can be
to apply.4 Under the DOJ’s theory, which the Federal District Court
accepted, point–of–sale competition on the price of making a purchase
with a credit card is an instrument creating economic efficiency.5 That is,
the economy would run more efficiently, and consumers would be better
off, if merchants were free to charge variable prices for different types of

2

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
Id. at 13.
4
See generally United States v. American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
5
The District Court held that the government had proven “American Express’s NDPs
have caused actual anticompetitive effects on interbrand competition. By preventing
merchants from steering additional charge volume to their least expensive network, for
example, the NDPs short–circuit the ordinary price–setting mechanism in the network
services market by removing the competitive ‘reward’ for networks offering merchants a
lower price for acceptance services. The result is an absence of price competition
among American Express and its rival networks.” American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d
at 151.
3
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credit cards.6 After all, charging different prices for using different types
of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of presumptively
positive price competition.
By contrast, the Second Circuit’s decision reversing the trial court
questioned that conclusion.7 To be sure, the antitrust laws presume that
price competition will produce efficient price levels.8 As Easterbrook
recognized, though, one cannot simply take as given that forcing rivalry at
every potential point where competition might occur will yield these
positive results.9 And the Second Circuit recognized that in credit card
markets, competition already occurs at multiple points.10 American
Express must compete to:
• convince cardholders to apply for and use its cards; and
• convince merchants to accept its cards.
The question, the Second Circuit correctly recognized, is whether
adding a third type of competition—for cardholders to use the card when
merchants pass through their card acceptance fees—would make
American Express’s card network more efficient or would it be, in
Easterbrook’s words, a “formula [for] disintegration” of the credit
system?11
By prohibiting merchants who accept American Express cards from
discriminating against the brand, the card company imposed a unilateral
vertical restraint.12 Such restraints are often deemed to be reasonable under
the antitrust laws because they may “stimulate interbrand competition.”13
This is because an upstream provider, like American Express, has little
interest in reducing its downstream sales. It would only impose a vertical
restraint if that restraint efficiently helped it to sell more products. Only
when an upstream provider has market power enabling it to impose
restraints that harm consumers by raising price or lowering quality does a
vertical restraint violate the antitrust laws.14
The Department of Justice’s theory postulated that the non–
discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant agreements
6

See id.
See generally United States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 204–06 (2nd Cir.
2016).
8
See National Soc. Of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978).
9
See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 6.
10
See generally American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179.
11
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 13.
12
See id. at 195.
13
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007).
14
Id. at 894 (“A manufacturer with market power . . . might use resale price
maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new
entrants.”)
7
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harmed consumers by effectively requiring merchants to increase their
prices to cover higher credit card fees for all customers because merchants
could not pass the cost of accepting American Express directly to
American Express’s own customers.15
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the potential for consumer
harm would exist if American Express charged merchants supra–
competitive prices and pocketed the excess as rents, but the court held that
the government failed to prove that rivalry on the price consumers paid to
use a credit card at the point of sale would increase efficiency in credit
card markets.16 As the Second Circuit explained, credit card markets are
two–sided.17 In order to prove harm to consumer welfare in a two–sided
market, an antitrust plaintiff needs to show that a restraint makes the
overall system less efficient.18 In other words, would consumers overall
pay more for less because of the restraint?
A card network like American Express must compete for both
cardholders and merchants. One, therefore, cannot demonstrate that price
increases on one side of the market are inefficient without examining how
those prices impact competition on the other side of the market. American
Express argued that it used increased revenue from the merchant side to
offer a better card product to its cardholders and compete more effectively
with other card networks, like Visa, for cardholder loyalty.19
The Second Circuit did not definitively decide whether American
Express’s non–discrimination provisions were pro– or anticompetitive.20
Based on the record evidence, the court couldn’t tell whether the non–
discrimination provisions made the market more or less efficient.21 It
simply concluded that two–sided market economics made the question
more complex than the government plaintiffs acknowledged in trying the
case.22 Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proving harm to
competition—i.e., a reduction in efficiency to the overall market—the
government plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.23
Part I reviews the economics of two–sided markets and provides
reasons to conclude that non–discrimination provisions in credit card
markets are efficient. Part II explains that a market’s two–sided nature
does not guarantee that participants in that market will charge competitive
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23



See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 184.
Id. at 204–06.
Id. at 198.
See id. at 193.
See id. at 202–03.
See id. at 205–06.
See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 206.
See id. at 206–07.
See id. at 205–06.
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prices. Card systems with market power could set merchant fees at supra–
competitive levels, leaving the market less efficient. This Part then
contrasts Visa’s and MasterCard’s fees in the 1990s and early 2000s–
which were challenged by merchants in a class action–with American
Express’s current fees. It concludes that the factors giving the merchants
a plausible case against Visa and MasterCard do not support the
government plaintiffs in their case against American Express. Part III
addresses a systemic concern expressed in a recent New York Times
editorial about how a decision in American Express’s favor might impact
the future enforcement of antitrust claims against dominant firms.24 This
Part concludes that those concerns are unfounded. The Sherman Act has
two principle sections. Truly dominant firms would remain subject to
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 1 vertical
restraint cases already require proof of consumer harm no different from
what the Second Circuit required in its decision favoring American
Express.

I.

THE ECONOMICS OF CREDIT CARD NETWORKS

In setting prices, card systems face two distinct customer bases:
cardholders and merchants. Within such a two–sided market, prices are
efficiently set at the level necessary to recover the system’s marginal costs,
but the efficient price for the cardholder and for the merchant may not
equal the marginal cost of providing the services received by each. On the
contrary, in a two–sided market customers that are less sensitive to price—
i.e., have lower demand elasticity— will pay more than the cost of serving
them while the more price–sensitive customers will pay less than the cost
of serving them.25 Assuming that merchant demand for card acceptance is
less elastic than cardholder demand, efficient pricing will place more of
the cost of the system on merchants than cardholders.26 If merchants pass
the cost of card acceptance on to the cardholders, however, the efficient
pricing structure would be disrupted. Pass–through pricing would undo the
balance between the relative elasticities of demand between card users and
merchants with respect to card use and would thus drive card usage down
below the efficient level.27

24

Lina M. Khan, “The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More Power,”
N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018) (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the-supremecourt-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html).
25
SEMERARO, supra note 1, at 347.
26
SEMERARO, supra note 25, at 353.
27
See id. at 353–58.
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A. Understanding Two–sided Markets
Credit card markets are far from unique. There are many markets in
which the use of the product or service by consumers on two different sides
directly impacts the utility of the product or service to the consumers on
the other side. Common examples of markets functioning this way include
newspapers (readers and advertisers), dating services (men and women),
and optical disc technology suppliers (disc pressers and player
manufacturers).28 The more readers, men, and disc pressers use these
products and services, the more valuable they will be to advertisers,
women, and player manufacturers, and vice versa.29
Although the connection between value and use across customer types
in a two–sided network market is intuitively obvious, the implication of
this economic effect for efficient pricing is rather opaque. In a typical one–
sided market, an efficient price—one that will lead to an optimal
consumption level—will generally approximate the marginal cost of
production plus the profit necessary to attract investment to the industry.30
This pricing model is efficient because it maximizes short–run output
consistently with the producer earning sufficient revenue to continue
providing the product or service.
In a two–sided market, the same principle applies, but efficient pricing
must take account of both total cost and the relative elasticities of demand
between the two customer sets.31 If the customers on each side of such a
market were charged the marginal cost of serving just their side of the
market, they could fail to internalize the impact of their decisions to the
customer set on the other side.32 For example, a card–accepting merchant
would fail to account for the benefits of card use to a customer who would
make the same purchase with or without a card.
28

For a detailed discussion of the economics of two–sided markets see generally David
S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two–Sided
Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667; David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of
Multi–Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325 (2003).
29
See generally EVANS & NOEL, supra note 28.
30
Michael L. Katz, What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does it Mean
for Public Policy?: Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY
127 (2005), https://www.kansascityfed.org/bXkVg/publicat/pscp/2005/katz.pdf.
31
EVANS & NOEL, supra note 28, at 681.
32
See KATZ, supra note 30, at 126–27; see generally Julian Wright, Optimal Card
Payment Systems, (May 8, 2002) (manuscript at 8) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=278047); see generally Margaret E. Guerin–Calvert & Janusz A.
Ordover, Merchant Benefits and Public Policy Towards Interchange: An Economic
Assessment, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 384, 384–85 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he network
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card–holders who use them compel
a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the cost–causality principles that
call for prices to be closely linked to the underlying costs of providing direct benefits to
either side of the market.”).
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Two–sided market economic theory predicts that if demand
elasticities diverge to any significant degree between the customers on
each side of the market, output under a pricing scheme that covered
marginal–cost separately on each side of the market would be inefficiently
low. To obtain an efficient output level, a producer must charge the
customer set that is more sensitive to price less than marginal cost of
serving that customer (effectively enabling those consumers to internalize
the benefits to both sides of the market).33
The classic example is the daily newspaper.34 Readers have many
sources of news, including television, magazines, and the internet. Reader
demand for newspapers is thus likely to be quite elastic, leading them to
turn away from the morning paper if the subscription prices were to
approach the marginal cost of producing and delivering it.35 By contrast,
advertisers perceive significant benefits in print advertising (so long as
readership is high), and are thus willing to pay substantially above the
newspapers’ marginal cost of printing and providing associated services
to the advertiser because of the value of exposure through a high
circulation paper.36 As a result, readers pay significantly below marginal
cost and advertisers pay substantially more.37 Competition between
newspapers and other media for advertising space still drives pricing, but
not to marginal cost plus normal profit for each customer set. This pricing
pattern efficiently optimizes newspaper circulation, satisfying both the
advertisers’ need for broad exposure and the readers’ need for
information.38
Assuming that newspapers have little market power, both advertisers
and readers would be worse off if pricing were forced into line with
marginal cost on each side of the market. If advertising fees were to drop
and reader fees proportionally increased, prices would move toward
marginal cost on each side of the market. Because reader demand is more
elastic, however, readership would drop more than advertising would
increase, and advertising rates would thus fall. As a result, the paper would
(1) earn lower overall revenue; (2) be less valuable to advertisers because
readership would fall; and (3) be less valuable to readers because the paper
would have less revenue for newsgathering.
33

KATZ, supra note 30, at 127; see Jean–Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation
Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON.
549, 566 (2002); see Wright, supra note 32, at 17.
34
For a formal treatment of this example see Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lener, Kevin
M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, Competition in Two–Sided Markets: The Antitrust
Economics of Payment Card Interchange, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 571, 577–79 (2006).
35
Id. at 579.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 577.
38
See id. at 579.
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B. Applying Two–sided Market Theory to Card Markets
To the extent that the elasticity of demand varies significantly between
merchants and cardholders, card systems resemble newspapers.39
Merchants, like print advertisers, have been willing to pay significantly
above the marginal cost of the credit card acceptance services presumably
because of the value card acceptance creates for a merchant.40
Cardholders, like newspaper readers, would be reluctant to pay the
marginal cost of providing credit cards and associated services.41 Thus,
two–sided market theory predicts that efficient credit card pricing would
resemble the existing marketplace—a greater share of the total costs of the
payment system are placed on merchants.42
To be sure, relative elasticities across customer groups are difficult to
measure. Long standing practice in credit card markets, however, appears
to confirm that cardholder demand is considerably more elastic than
merchant demand and thus merchants pay more than the marginal cost of
serving them and cardholders pay less.43 Since the beginning, card systems
have adopted cost allocation systems that empower cardholders to use
cards without taking account of the per transaction costs that arise as a
result of their decision.44 Every existing credit card system, until recently,
prohibited merchants from passing on the price that they pay for card
acceptance to cardholders, and each system adopted that pricing policy
well before it had market power.45 By uniformly adopting a pricing policy
in a competitive market that shifts revenue from the merchant side to the

39

Id. at 580.
See id. at 585.
41
See id. at 585–88.
42
Id. at 584; see also Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, 50
J. OF INDUS. ECON. 103, 115 (2002) (explaining that “increasing total output . . . by
subsidizing price cuts where demand elasticity is high . . . increases the size of the pie for
the system as a whole.”).
43
In ATM and PIN debit card markets, by contrast, interchange fees have in some cases
flowed away from cardholders to those who accept debit cards as a means to access cash.
44
See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust
Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 967, 988 (2007).
45
See id. at 988 (explaining that “[t]he direction of interchange fee payments . . .
appears to be consistent with an efficient and competitive market.”); see also KATZ, supra
note 30, at 123 (virtually all debit card systems also have interchange fees flowing from
merchants to issuers). Recently, Visa and MasterCard agreed as part of a settlement
agreement to permit merchants to surcharge credit card transactions. That agreement was
rejected by the courts. And even if it remained in place, it was designed to compel
merchants to inflict more harm on American Express than they would on Visa and
MasterCard.
40
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cardholder side, the card systems practice accords with what two–sided
market theory would predict.46
The efficiency of this form of elasticity–based pricing garners further
support by the growth in both merchant acceptance and card use over
time.47 If a pricing policy placing a greater burden on the merchant side
were inefficient, one would expect to see merchants rejecting credit cards.
But that has not happened. Card acceptance has spread to more and more
segments of the economy. Although many card–accepting merchants do
not accept American Express cards, the number of merchants who do has
been increasing.48 The existing system of cost allocation thus appears to
be efficient because forcing cardholders to cover costs now paid by
merchants would be likely to lead to an inefficient under–use of cards.49
To understand the anticompetitive effect of allowing merchants to
pass the cost of card acceptance on to consumers, consider a chess club
that when charging uniform dues to all players has a membership that is
(1) disproportionately low–skill and (2) lower in number than the club
could efficiently accommodate. The club organizers therefore decide to
offer free admission to high–skilled players, while increasing the dues
charged to low–skilled club members. This differential pricing:
(1) attracts more high–skilled players;
(2) makes the club more desirable for low–skilled players who thus
attend more often; and
(3) increases membership and utilization of club facilities.
46
See Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced Sharing: An
Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. Rev. 57, 97–98 (2003) (discussing
generally how practices undertaken by firms in competitive markets are presumptively
efficient).
47
Judge Easterbrook has famously explained that practices increasing output over time
are likely to be efficient. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 979 (1986); see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 2, at 30–34.
48
Robert Harrow, More Consumers and Merchants Turning To American Express
Credit Cards, https://www.valuepenguin.com/2017/07/more-consumers-and-merchantsturning-american-express-credit-cards (updated Apr. 5, 2018).
49
KATZ, supra note 30, at 126 (explaining that surcharging can undo the effects of
interchange fees). Alan Frankel has questioned this justification for the no–surcharge rule,
arguing that if merchants want to encourage additional card use, they could easily do so
themselves through point–of–sale discounts and other incentives. Alan S. Frankel & Allan
L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 627, 647
(2006). But merchants face conflicting incentives. The benefits that they receive from
credit cards are often infra–marginal, such as an overall increase in spending levels not
directly tied to individual transaction purchase decisions. Merchants benefit at the margin
only when the cardholder would not make the purchase without the card. If the customer
would make the purchase in all events, a merchant may experience a marginal benefit from
the use of another means of payment, but an infra–marginal loss if cardholders stopped
carrying credit cards altogether. See Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of
Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1348–49, 1353 (2008).
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By attracting more high–skilled players through differential pricing,
the club functions more efficiently and thus all of its members benefit. To
be sure, low–skilled players bear a greater percentage of the cost of
operating the club than high–skilled players, but the club provides more
value to them—i.e., the chance to play against and learn from higher–
skilled players. If this pricing strategy were not efficient, low–skilled
players would leave the club rather than pay the higher dues.
The chess club with differential pricing corresponds to the existing
credit card market in which merchants, like low–skilled players in the
hypothetical, pay a higher percentage of the costs of the payment system
than necessary to recover the marginal cost of serving them. The DOJ’s
theory of the case presumes that the chess club’s pricing policy would be
inefficient because high–skilled players were not covering the club’s full
cost of serving them and revenues generated by low–skilled players, the
analogy continues, inefficiently subsidized the high–skilled players.
By choosing to frequent the club in greater numbers, however, the
low–skilled players demonstrated that they preferred the club with
differential pricing to the less expensive club with a single price.
Merchants’ willingness to accept credit cards in ever increasing numbers
within the card systems’ existing pricing models communicates the same
message.
Discrimination among payment systems in the card market would
disrupt this presumptively efficient pricing mechanism by shifting some
costs onto cardholders. A similar disruption might occur in the chess club
if the meeting organizers surcharged high–skilled players by, for example,
charging them more for refreshments at club meetings than the low–skilled
players must pay, undoing the benefit of the differential pricing. High–
skilled players enticed to join the club by the no–dues policy would soon
realize that they were paying more for refreshments. The meeting
organizer, like a merchant surcharging card transactions, would negate the
benefit of the no–dues policy. The likely effect would be that high–skilled
players would quit, and the club would thus end up back where it started:
with an inefficiently low number of members all paying the same entry
fee.
Just as high–skilled chess players would quit the club if short–sighted
meeting organizers surcharged their refreshments, cardholders would
reduce their use of cards if merchants passed on acceptance fees by
charging their customers a per transaction fee to use a particular means of
payment.



2018]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

II.

41

SUPRA–COMPETITIVE CREDIT CARD PRICING

Two–sided market economics provide a reason why placing a greater
share of a card network’s costs on the merchant side is likely to be
efficient. But it does not insulate card networks from violating the antitrust
laws by charging merchants fees at a level above what efficient two–sided
market pricing would require. When merchants first sued Visa and
MasterCard—but tellingly not American Express—attacking the
networks’ merchant fees, I presented a theory explaining why the
merchants had a strong case that the Visa and MasterCard fees—though
lower than American Express’s fees—might nonetheless by inefficiently
high.50 Two points were critical to that theory.
First, merchants had a legitimate argument that the banks controlling
Visa and MasterCard exercised sufficient market power to block
merchants from dropping either brand because too many consumers rely
exclusively on their cards and thus, in the United States, virtually all card–
accepting merchants accept Visa and MasterCard.51 By contrast, “roughly
one–third of credit card–accepting merchants in the United States” do not
accept American Express cards.52
Second, there appeared to be no plausible justification for the
increases in merchant fees that proceeded the filing of that class action.
The banks controlling Visa and MasterCard were growing revenues
through the revolving credit business and improved technology was
lowering the costs of fraud risk and other aspects of merchant
acceptance.53 Visa and MasterCard never offered a plausible explanation
for their fee increases during the relevant period before the complaint was
filed.54 Curiously, the Department of Justice never joined the merchant
class action against Visa and MasterCard.
In this case, American Express did offer a plausible explanation for its
increasing merchant fees.55 It’s strategy to compete for cardholders—most
of whom did not carry revolving credit balances—by offering an elite
package of cardholder rewards and marketing the superiority of its reward
program to potential cardholders.56 This competitive strategy explained
the network’s merchant pricing policies to a far greater extent than Visa
and MasterCard explained their fee increases in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The following sections set out two reasons that the DOJ might have
concluded that merchant discrimination would produce more efficient card
50
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pricing: (1) Visa and MasterCard in litigation settlements had agreed to
permit surcharging; and (2) prohibiting discrimination inefficiently
compelled merchants to impose American Express’s high cost on all of its
consumers. It finds both theories unavailing.

A.

Visa and MasterCard Settlements

Perhaps the Antitrust Division believed that by agreeing to permit
discrimination among payment schemes through surcharging, Visa and
MasterCard had acknowledged that prohibiting discrimination was not
necessary to ensure efficient card pricing. But that settlement was
configured specifically to ensure that any surcharging would necessarily
benefit Visa and MasterCard when compared to American Express.57 The
settlement prohibited merchants from surcharging a lower–priced card
without also surcharging a higher priced one, even if the merchant
perceived more value from the higher priced card.58 Given state laws
prohibiting surcharging, and American Express’s continuous enforcement
of its non–discrimination restraint,59 Visa and MasterCard knew that
significant surcharging was extremely unlikely to occur and, if it did, it
would only hurt American Express more than it would hurt them. The Visa
and MasterCard settlement agreements thus provide little confidence that
discrimination would make card fees more efficient.

B.

Inefficient Cost–Shifting Among Consumers

The DOJ surely recognizes that permitting discrimination would
reduce the welfare of American Express cardholders by denying the card
network the ability to obtain the revenue it needs from merchants to
support the rewards it provides to cardholders. The Division must,
therefore, believe that this loss would be outweighed by the gains of other
consumers who presumably pay higher prices because of American
Express’s higher cardholder fees, but who do not receive any rewards. But
it is unclear why this would be the case. The Division appears to assume
implausibly that merchants who accept American Express cards receive
no benefits from doing so and simply pass on the cost of card acceptance

57

See generally Steven Semeraro, Settlement without Consent: Assessing The Credit
Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186, 208–11 (2015).
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See generally id. (citing In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount
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paragraphs permitting surcharging: ¶ 41 (brand level surcharging, but ¶¶ 41–45 prohibiting
surcharging one brand if a more expensive card were not surcharged))).
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to their consumers on a dollar–for–dollar basis.60 But, if it were the case
that merchants obtained no benefits from accepting American Express
cards, they would simply not accept the card, joining the one–third of
card–accepting merchants who do not accept American Express cards
now. The reason that merchants accept American Express cards thus must
be because they obtain the benefit of increased sales as a result of
accepting the card.
If accepting American Express cards enables a merchant to increase
sales, then one cannot presume that the merchant’s prices will increase on
a dollar–for–dollar basis to cover the fees it pays to American Express.61
By increasing its sales, a merchant can spread its fixed costs over a larger
total sales volume, potentially enabling it to lower its prices compared to
what they would be if it did not accept American Express cards at all.62
Whether the increase in sales that accepting a card brand brings to a
merchant increases or decreases its ultimate prices is a particularly
difficult empirical question, but one cannot simply assume that prices will
increase, much less on a dollar–for–dollar basis.
Moreover, discrimination schemes are not costless to implement, and
they would thus add to a merchant’s costs. Whether the merchant would
save more on reduced card acceptance fees than the cost of a
discrimination program is again an empirical question. That merchants
have refused to implement cash discounting schemes, despite the right to
do so, for decades suggests that the savings in reduced card fees would not
outweigh the cost of a discrimination scheme.
In the end, it is entirely possible that permitting merchant
discrimination would simply enable merchants with market power to
extract even more rents from their customers by discouraging consumers
who would make purchases with or without cards to refrain from using
them or paying higher prices. But there is no reason to presume that this
practice will lead a merchant with market power to lower its prices to other
customers.
And even if American Express’s merchant fees are inefficiently high,
merchants that discriminated against American Express would be
extremely unlikely to calculate a surcharge or other form of discrimination
at precisely the level needed to strip a card network of its inefficient
overcharge. This is true because merchants generally would not have
access to knowledge about the relative cross–elasticities between
cardholders and merchants on which efficient card network pricing
60
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depends, and even if merchants had perfect knowledge, they wouldn’t
impose the right surcharge because they do not have the right incentives.
Merchants care only about whether a customer makes a purchase. Any
benefit that accrued to a card–using customer from the use of the card in
situations where the customer would make the purchase even without the
card would be ignored by the merchant.
Ultimately, merchants would likely divide into roughly two camps.
The first group—merchants in reasonably competitive markets—would
likely find the costs of discriminating prohibitive.63 The second group—
merchants with substantial market power—might impose a surcharge or
other form of discrimination, but these merchants could potentially retain
a significant portion of the card fee savings as profit rather than pass it on
to their customers.64 This second group of merchants may even use the
surcharging power to exact greater profits from those consumers who must
use a credit card for a particular transaction.65

III.

SYSTEMIC ANTITRUST CONCERNS

In a recent op–ed in the New York Times, Lina M. Khan, the director
of legal policy at Open Markets Institute and a visiting fellow at Yale Law
School, argued that a holding in favor of American Express “would create
de facto antitrust immunity for the most powerful companies in the
economy,” such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon.66 This fear is
misplaced for two reasons.
First, the companies she identified are true dominant firms in their
industries. As she correctly recognizes, “antitrust scrutiny of their conduct
[is] especially important.”67 These firms, however, would be subject to that
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as Microsoft was in the U.S.68
and Google has been under the European Union equivalent.69 The issue
here is not the law, but the fortitude of U.S. enforcement authorities to
bring monopolization cases.
63
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American Express, by contrast, is not similarly dominant. It has less
than a thirty percent market share, smaller than Visa and on a par with
MasterCard, both of which have the entire banking industry behind them
and significantly larger merchant networks.70 Although Khan claims that
“[t]he credit card industry is a classic case of oligopoly,”71 it is hard to find
evidence of that. In an oligopoly, one would expect stable pricing and a
lack of innovative competitive efforts. The card networks, however,
compete fiercely for cardholders and have maintained a differing range of
merchant fees. Visa and MasterCard have made great strides eating into
American Express’s strength at the high end of the market while American
Express has competed to capture more middle–class card holders. To be
sure, all of the networks charge merchants more than the cost of providing
service to them, but that is the expected result of the nature of efficient
pricing given market conditions, not evidence of oligopoly behavior. To
claim that credit card networks are anticompetitive because they charge
merchants a lot and cardholders very little would be the equivalent of
claiming that newspapers are anticompetitive because they charge
advertisers a lot and readers very little.
Second, the concern that Khan expresses about the difficulty of
proving a vertical restraint case is—for better or worse—already part and
parcel of antitrust law. If American Express wins this case, she argues,
tech “platforms will be able to engage in anticompetitive activity with one
set of users, so long as they can plausibly claim that harmful conduct
enabled them to benefit another group.”72 She offers as an example that
Uber could prohibit its drivers from also serving rivals like Lyft and
suppress the drivers’ income.73 “Under the current approach,” she argues
“these exclusive agreements would likely violate antitrust law. But under
the Second Circuit’s analysis, the case would go nowhere unless plaintiffs
could show that this practice also harmed riders.”74
That’s simply not an accurate description of either current law or the
law that would exist if the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit.
Current law governing vertical restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act requires proof that the defendant has the ability to harm consumers
and that the restraint in question could plausibly have that effect.75 Under
current law, a court considering Uber’s exclusivity policy would ask why
Uber would impose such a restraint on its own drivers. An obvious reason
would be that exclusive Uber drivers would accept calls from riders more
70
71
72
73
74
75



United States v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 235, 240 (2d Cir. 2003).
KHAN, supra note 24.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890.

46

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:29

quickly, making Uber a more effective competitor against other taxi
services and increasing its output, which would benefit both Uber and its
drivers as well as their customers.
No similarly obvious anticompetitive story exists. Assuming Uber has
market power—which it probably does not in any market including Lyft—
it could benefit either by driving down the fee it pays drivers or driving up
the fee it receives from riders, but the proposed exclusivity restraint would
do neither. By limiting a driver’s sources of income, Uber would need to
pay that driver more to convince her to accept the exclusive deal. Riders
would be hurt as prices went up, but not in a way that would benefit Uber
because it would be using the price increase to pay drivers more.
A plausible antitrust theory attacking Uber’s hypothetical exclusivity
policy would exist under current law if, by imposing exclusivity
requirements on its drivers, Uber could deny Lyft and other competitors
adequate access to drivers. But by limiting the ability of its competitors to
meet consumer demand, Uber could raise its prices to riders, violating the
antitrust laws. Contrary to Khan’s assertion, current law would thus
require proof that the restraint on drivers hurt riders in order for it to violate
the antitrust laws.
And nothing would change were American Express to win its case.
The issue in a Rule of Reason case is whether a restraint is likely to
increase output in the market and thus better serve consumer demand, or
lower output and, therefore, drive up prices.76 In a two–sided market, a
price increase on one side of the market may increase output across the
entire system and that appears to have been the effect of American
Express’s non–discrimination provision.77 Credit card use has increased,
by definition benefiting the consumers who use credit cards.
To prove an anticompetitive effect, a plaintiff would need to show off–
setting consumer harm either through a reduction in the defendant’s own
output or through a reduction in market output because the restraint
hinders the ability of competitors in that market.78 In a case against
Google, for example, the plaintiff would be required to show either a
reduction in ads or searches on Google, or a hindering of competitive
search engines’ ability to compete with Google because of the restraint.
The Second Circuit properly recognized that the government plaintiffs had
failed to articulate a plausible story for how American Express’s non–
discrimination provisions could decrease its own output or the output of
the broader market.79
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CONCLUSION
The economics of two–sided markets do rule out the possibility of
anticompetitive harm, but the Second Circuit correctly concluded that the
government plaintiffs failed to prove harm in this case. The merchant class
may have a stronger case against Visa and MasterCard in that on–going
litigation if it ever gets to trial.



